Bail in the United States: A System in Need of Reform by Lannon, Cecilia D.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 10
1-1968
Bail in the United States: A System in Need of
Reform
Cecilia D. Lannon
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Cecilia D. Lannon, Bail in the United States: A System in Need of Reform, 20 Hastings L.J. 380 (1968).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol20/iss1/10
NOTES
BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: A SYSTEM
IN NEED OF REFORM
Bail, as it exists in the United States, is a constitutional concept,
a lucrative business, a method of avoiding prolonged incarceration,
and a system which intensifies the disturbing economic polarization
found in American cities today.
Introduction
The bail system which we received from England is certainly
not the one in existence in the United States today. In England,
personal responsibility was emphasized: the accused and his sure-
ties, who were friends and relatives, never commercial bondsmen,
entered into a contract with the Crown whereby if the accused failed
to appear as requested, he would forfeit what he and his sureties
had promised.' Such a system of personal responsibility has existed
in England for centuries.
In the United States, however, this system would not have been
feasible until late in the 19th century. A nation of colonies with
rapidly expanding frontiers, with citizens who had no roots, no fami-
lies, and few friends, could not rely on a personal bail system. In-
stead, a commercial bail system evolved rapidly in the colonies, a
system wherein an accused could obtain a surety for the payment of
a sum of money. But rather than dying out as our nation became
more settled and populated, the commercial bail system became firmly
entrenched, and a man's ability to pay the bondsman's fee determined
whether he would in fact be released from jail pending trial or ap-
peal. This system is lucrative for the bondsman and convenient for
the courts, which do not have to concern themselves with the addi-
tional administrative work a personal bail system necessitates; it
is convenient also for the well-to-do accused. In fact, only the in-
digent or unpopular accused is injured by the commercial bail system,
but his injury is sometimes devastating.
Confusion in Concepts
As a legal concept, bail has caused great confusion in our courts
because it is not settled whether the right of an accused to be ad-
mitted to bail pending trial is a constitutional right, implicit in the
1 McCree, Keynote Address: Bail and the Indigent Defendant, 1965
U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2.
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eighth amendment, or merely a statutory right, subject to regulation
by the Congress or by the respective state legislature. Also unsettled
is the extent of one's right to be admitted to bail pending review of
his case, when the presumption of innocence is gone.
2
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Gray, appeared to favor a statutory basis for the right to
bail:
The statutes of the United States have been framed upon the theory
that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally
adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled
to undergo imprisonment or punishment, but may be admitted to
bail, not only after arrest and before trial, but after conviction and
pending a writ of error.3
In 1926, however, Justice Butler speaking as Circuit Justice for
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Motlow,4 said that the eighth
amendment implies a right to bail at least before trial and that the
purpose of the amendment is to prevent practical denial of bail by
fixing the amount so unreasonably high that it cannot be given.
"The provision forbidding excessive bail would be futile if magistrates
were left free to deny bail."'5 In support of his interpretation of the
eighth amendment, Justice Butler cited the recommendations of the
Senior Circuit Judges Conference held in 1925:
The right to bail before conviction is secured by the Constitution to
those charged with violation of the criminal laws of the United States.
The right to bail after conviction by a court or a judge . . . is not a
matter of constitutional right. The acts of Congress make provision
for allowance of bail after conviction. . . 6
In the 1950's there were two important decisions regarding the
existence of a constitutional right to bail. Carlson v. Landon,7 was a
civil case involving the deportation of aliens accused of being Com-
munists. Bail was denied to the defendants, and the Supreme Court
said in a 5-4 decision that the eighth amendment gives no right to
bail in all cases. That amendment only assures that bail shall not be
excessive where it is proper to grant it.5 A vigorous dissent was en-
tered by Justice Black who said that the interpretation of the ma-
jority, allowing Congress to permit confinement without bail, re-
stricted the amendment to a mere limitation on judges and relegated
2 It seems well settled that there is no constitutional right to bail after
conviction. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 666 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1962); United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1961);
text accompanying notes 19-23, 75-81 infra. Even before trial bail may be
denied one accused of a capital offense. FED. R. Cpam. P. 46(a) (1); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1270; cf. United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579, 583
(7th Cir. 1949); Rowan v. Randolph, 268 F. 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1920).
3 Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
4 10 F.2d 657 (Butler, Circuit Justice, 1926).
5 Id. at 659.
6 Id. at 662. Neither case has in reality done much to settle the issue.
7 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
8 Id. at 544-46.
BAIL REFORM
it "below the level of a pious admonition."9 Justice Black contended
that the purpose of the amendment was to make it impossible for any
agency of the government, even the Congress, to authorize the impris-
onment of persons for a moment longer than was necessary to assure
their attendance in court.10
Contrasted with Carlson is Stack v. Boyle," in which an appli-
cation for bail for violations of the Smith Act was heard. Although
the holding was based upon the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court in Stack said that the
"traditional right" to freedom before conviction permits unhampered
preparation of defense and prevents infliction of punishment before
conviction.22 "Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle,
will lose its meaning."'13 To this, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter
added that bail evolved not as a device for keeping persons in jail
on mere accusation until convenient to try them, but rather to en-
able persons to remain free until found guilty. 4 Without this guar-
antee, even the wrongfully accused are punished, and are "handi-
capped in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses,
and preparing a defense."'15
It is this language in Stack which has been relied upon recently
as support for the proposition that the right to bail is guaranteed by
the eighth amendment "by necessary implication."' 0  After citing
Stack, the court in Trimble v. Stone'7 stated that the right to bail
pending trial is absolute, except in capital cases, no matter how un-
savory the defendant's past record or how vicious the offense.' 8
Thus, the confusion in basic concept continues. The Supreme Court
has not defined the scope of the eighth amendment, nor has it
stated definitely and without reservation when a particular decision
has turned on statutory requirements instead of constitutional man-
dates.
Another problem facing the courts is that of determining the
circumstances under which bail may be denied. Regardless of the un-
settled constitutional question, the right to bail before trial is guar-
anteed except in capital cases by rule at the federal level' and by
statute in many states.2 0  But the right to bail after the trial has
9 Id. at 556.
3o Id. at 557-58.
11 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
12 Id. at 4.
's Id.
14 Id. at 7-8.
15 Id. at 8.
16 Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 484 (D.D.C. 1960).
17 Id. at 483.
18 Id. at 485.
'9 FED. R. CRni. P. 46(a)(1); see text accompanying notes 58-68 infra.
20 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1270-71.
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begun or pending appeal is not absolute,21 nor is it constitutionally
guaranteed.22  Instead, the denial or granting of bail under such
circumstances is largely a matter of judicial discretion within the
framework of certain rules.2 3
Bail is denied pending appeal to prevent further crime24 and to
protect the public.2 5  It is terminated to assure orderly progress of
the trial.2 6 Although such denials are subject to rigid scrutiny,2 7
they are an accepted part of the administration of bail. Since this is
the case, it may be questioned what has happened to the traditional
notion that an accused is not to be imprisoned until his conviction is
upheld by a court of last resort.2 8
But it is not the denial of bail in these situations which has
caused the bail system to be described as "repugnant to the spirit
of the Constitution and in direct conflict with ... basic tenets .... "9
Instead it is the denial of bail to the poor, the unpopular, the sus-
pected subversive, and the nonconformist that has brought criticism
upon the system. It is the emphasis upon ability to pay, coupled
with the often unwarranted reliance upon discretion at lower judicial
echelons which has made the system susceptible to abuse. Whether
these abuses are due to confusion of principles, vague laws, or mere
abuse of judicial discretion will not be answered in this note. In-
stead, the remainder of the note will examine areas in which the bail
system has either proved useless to provide freedom pending final
determination of guilt or has been used as a weapon against unpopu-
lar citizens. Existent bail reform projects will be examined, their
shortcomings discussed, and an alternative suggested.
21 Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962);
Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950).
22 See note 2 supra.
23 Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 281 (Jackson, Circuit Justice,
1950); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1272; see FED. R. Cnwi. P. 46 (a) (2).
24 Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 667-69 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1962) (to prevent harm to the principal witness); see United States v.
Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1961).
25 Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8, 9 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1964);
Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994, 996 (Warren, Circuit Justice, 1962)
(dictum).
26 Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (Harlan, Circuit Justice,
1961); United States v. Rice, 192 F. 720 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (to prevent
probable attempts to corrupt jury); People ex Tel. Calascione v. Ramsden, 20
App. Div. 2d 142, 147-48, 246 N.Y.S.2d 84, 89 (1963).
27 See Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967); Carbo v. United States,
82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962).
28 See Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895), discussed in text ac-
companying note 3 supra.
29 MVIcCree, Keynote Address: Bail and the Indigent Defendant, 1965
U. ILL. L.F. 1.
November 1968] BAIL REFORM
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Bail in Practice
Problems in General: The Indigent and Unpopular in the System
Griffin v. Ilinois3° was not merely a decision granting indigents
the same right to appeal as that enjoyed by the economically favored;
that decision enunciated the principle upon which later decisions, and
whole legislative schemes (such as Legal Services for the Poor) were
to be founded: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends upon the amount of money he has."31
Since Griffin, indigency has been regarded as a relevant factor in
any consideration of what is constitutionally acceptable practice in
federal and state judicial systems.3 2 Since bail is and should be part
of our judicial system and not a bastion of free enterprise, the treat-
ment of the indigent in the bail system is constitutionally important.
That such treatment had become insensitive and punitive was called
to the attention of the public and the courts not by a judicial officer,
but instead by Louis Schweitzer, a philanthropist, who on a tour of
New York City's detention prisons was appalled to discover that, in
1960, people were serving excessive time in prison only because they
were poor.33
That poverty is a major factor in pre-trial detention was evidenced
by a study in 1956 of New York City felony cases. This study, which
preceded Schweitzer's report by four years, showed that of the 2,292
varied criminal cases in which bail was set, only 49 percent of those
accused could furnish bail; 28 percent of those accused could not fur-
nish $500 bail and 86 percent could not furnish $7,500. 34 That these
indigents suffer lengthy pre-trial incarceration has been amply docu-
mented, as in the case of a defendant accused of taking $14.05 from
a subway change booth who was jailed for six months because he
could not afford the bondsman's fee of $105 for his $2,500 bond.
The defendant was later acquitted of the charge, but in the interim
had lost his job and his apartment, and had spent half a year in jail
with a homosexual, a drug addict and a veteran convict.35 In an-
30 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
31 Id. at 19.
32 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent must be
provided with counsel on appeal); Smith v. Bennet, 365 U.S. 708 (1961)
(indigent cannot be required to pay $4 filing fee for writ of habeas corpus);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (indigent cannot be required to pay $20
fee to appeal felony conviction to Ohio Supreme Court). See also Note, The
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967) (arguing
that indigents should be given free counsel in certain civil cases); Note,
Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and its Progeny, 16
STAN. L. Ruv. 394 (1964).
33 R. GOLDFARm, RANSOM 151 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RANsom].
Schweitzer's determination to correct this situation gave rise to the Vera
Foundation and the original Bail Project in New York City. Id. at 152.
34 Id. at 39.
35 Id. at 33.
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other case, the accused was jailed for 54 days because he could not
raise $300 bail for driving without a license. The maximum penalty
for the offense was 5 days in jail.36 Such detentions occur often and
cannot be considered extraordinary. 37
Since Schweitzer's investigation, which led eventually to the for-
mation of the Vera Foundation, other criticisms have been raised con-
cerning the bail system in the United States. For example, the sys-
tem itself varies from state to state, and even from county to county
within a state.38 In some areas, bail may be set by a judge; in other
areas, by a magistrate, who may not be an attorney, or by a police
officer or even the district attorney. 39 The amount of bail set varies
not only according to the individual accused's propensity to flee before
his case comes to trial, which is the standard set by the United States
Supreme Court for determining whether bail is excessive,40 but also
by the offense charged.41 This, too, varies from county to county.
For example, in one Idaho county, the typical bail for nonviolent
felonies is $300, while in another it is $5,000; in one Indiana county,
bail for manslaughter is $10,000, while in another it is $3,000.42 In
urban areas it was found that bail is generally given by a commercial
bondsman, while in rural areas, personal bondsmen are used.43 The
percentage of defendants who cannot make bail varies also: in San
Francisco it is 57 percent, in St. Louis 79 percent, in Miami 71 per-
cent.44 And the number of days those who make bail must wait after
bail is set until they are released varies from one to more than
thirty days.45
That the indigent are included within those who cannot make
bail and must languish in jail until trial is obvious. Yet these are the
very people who can least afford incarceration. Time spent in jail
means loss of wages, usually loss of employment, disturbance of fam-
ily life, probable dependency on welfare and an inability to pay for or
participate in the preparation of an adequate defense. The accused
is kept with convicted criminals and must enter the courtroom in
the custody of an officer. His appearance is obviously not as im-
36 Id,
37 Id. at 36.
38 Silverstein, Panel Discussion: Pretrial Release Problems, 1965 U. ILL.
L.F. 20, 25-27.
39 Id. at 26.
40 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
41 E.g., CAL. PEN. Cons § 1275: "In fixing the amount of bail, the judge
... shall take into consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the
previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his ap-
peering at the trial or hearing of the case. .... "
42 Silverstein, Panel Discussion: Pretrial Release Problems, 1965 U. ILL.
L.F. 20, 26.
43 Id.
44 La Fave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 8, 10.
45 Silverstein, Panel Discussion: Pretrial Release Problems, 1965 U. ILL.
L.F. 20, 27.
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pressive to the judge or jury as that of a man walking into the court-
room in the company of his family and friends. What is most tragic
about pre-trial incarceration, however, is its effect on the outcome of
the trial. An accused who has been released prior to trial, and who
has kept his job and his social contacts, is more likely to be placed on
probation than one who has been in jail. Statistics for the city of
Philadelphia, for example, show that, of 529 serious criminal cases
where defendants were bailed, 275 were convicted and only 22 per-
cent of these were sent to prison, while of 417 other defendants who
were not released, 340 were convicted and 59 percent were sent to
prison.46 Thus the accused who cannot afford bail not only must suf-
fer imprisonment without regard to his guilt or innocence, but also
must incur the substantial risk that he will be found guilty and sent
to jail for reasons other than solely those presented at trial.47  In
Butler v. Crumlish,48 the court said that it is
common knowledge that the system of bail, based as it is on financial
ability, is weighted heavily against the poor. This is especially true
in the great urban areas where populations are highly mobile and
family roots do not reach deep. The friend or relative who formerly
tendered the security of a freeholder has been largely supplanted by
the professional bondsman. He must be paid a premium in all cases,
and he often requires cash or similar security before agreeing to
guarantee the appearance at trial of a defendant who is personally
unknown to him. The theoretical equality of the right to bail when
all are not financially equal thus has become in reality a deep and
wounding social inequality, increasingly oppressive to the poor and
the vagrant. It brings to mind Anatole France's ironic epigram that
the law in its majestic impartiality forbids the rich and the poor
alike to sleep under bridges. 49
But the bail system does not militate solely against the poor.
The system often is used against unpopular persons who normally
46 Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadel-
phia, 102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1031, 1052-53 (1954).
47 That this situation gives rise to questions of equal protection was
obvious to Justice Douglas in 1960 when he stated in Bandy v. United States,
81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960), that in the case of a defendant
without property, the demand by a court of a substantial bond, or even a
bond in a modest amount, may have the effect of denying him release. He
is clearly not on equal terms with other defendants because of his indigence-
an inequality condemned by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
48 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964). In this case Judge Freedman held,
in issuing a preliminary injunction, that there was "substantial merit" in
the claim that the practice of forcing an indigent, non-bailable defendant
to appear in line-ups for crimes other than the one for which he was awaiting
trial was unconstitutional. Id. at 568; accord, Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710,
715-18 (3d Cir. 1965) (Freedman, J.) (dissenting opinion); cf. United States v.
Evans, 239 F. Supp. 554, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1965). But see United States v. Evans,
359 F.2d 776, 777 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
49 229 F. Supp. 565, 567-68; cf. Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 12
(Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961); Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197
(Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960).
THE H-ASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
could afford bail set to deter flight,50 but cannot afford bail set to
teach them a lesson,51 or to respond to public pressure and ani-
mosity against them,52 or to prevent suspected commission of future
crimes,53 or to curb unpatriotic statements. 54 That bail is set for such
purposes is disclosed by the judges themselves in setting bail:
I disagree with you, Mr. District Attorney. I feel that the man
should be punished and I don't feel that $500.00 is sufficient.55
The only thing I say is this: rm going to insist that these boys are
not to be bailed out. I'm going to set such bail that they will not
be bailed out .... Let them see what the inside of these jails look
like. Maybe that will be a deterrent to them.56
Such practices may result in tragedy for the accused who is to
be "taught a lesson," as in the case of a 17-year-old first offender
who was savagely beaten, sexually assaulted, kicked and stomped
to death by two ex-convicts with whom he had been confined. The
day before, when his older brother inquired about release on bail, the
brother was told: "The boys in back are having a big time. Don't
worry, we'll just give them a 'taste of jail' to scare them, but they
are having more fun than you are on the outside.
57
Constitutional and Statutory Requirements
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure section 46(a) (1) give
the accused the right to bail in all noncapital cases; decisions have
construed the basic right conferred by this rule, so that judges have
standards to which they can refer in setting bail.55 The amount to
be set must be that which will assure the accused's presence at
the trial.59 In setting bail, the judge may consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged, 0 the weight of the evidence
50 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (sole purpose of bail is to
assure defendant's presence at trial and submission to sentence if found guilty).
51 Cf. id.; Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1034, 1038-39 (1954).
52 Cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); Compelling Appearance in
Court: Administration of Bail in Philadlephia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1033-34
(1954).
53 See United States v. Foster, 79 F. Supp. 422, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
54 Cf. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1950).
55 RAsom 47.
56 Id.
57 Mann, Panel Discussion: Pretrial Release Problems, 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
20, 27.
58 E.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); United States v. Radford,
361 F.2d 777, 780-81 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 877 (1967); Warren
v. Richardson, 333 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Rubin-
stein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002, 1004 (2d Cir. 1946).
59 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
o0 Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967) (quoting from FED. R. Camn. P. 46(a) (1), (3)).
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against the accused, .l his financial ability,62 his character,6 3 and fi-
nally, the policy of the court against unnecessary detention before
trial.64 It is unconstitutional to set bail in such an amount as to
assure that the accused will not be released,65 but the mere fact that
he cannot afford the bail set does not mean that it is excessive.66 Bail
before trial may not be denied merely because the accused is thought
to be dangerous to the community, 67 but only if the conduct of the
defendant significantly threatens the orderly progress of the trial.68
Similar considerations govern in state proceedings. Palmer v.
District Court69 held that, where the right to bail was set forth in
the state constitution:
Irrespective of the villainy of the accused or the heinousness of his
offense [other than capital offenses], without regard for public opin-
ion, or for the personal views of an individual officer as to the
wisdom of the constitutional provision such provision is binding
without qualification . . . .70
Admission to bail pending appeal also is governed by rule and
case law in federal courts. Section 46(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows the accused to be admitted to bail if his
appeal is not frivolous or taken for delay. In setting bail after con-
viction, the courts are required to consider the danger of flight.71 If
the defendant cannot afford a bond, the court is constitutionally ob-
ligated to inquire whether other assurances of his presence will suf-
fice.
61 United States v. -Radford, 361 F.2d 777, 780 (4th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 877 (1967) (quoting from FED. R. CP i. P. 46(c)).
62 Id.
63 Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967).
64 United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002, 1004 (2d
Cir. 1946).
65 Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960).
66 Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967); United States v. Radford, 361 F.2d 777, 781 (4th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 877 (1967); White v. United States, 330 F.2d
811, 814 (8th Cir. 1964); Pilkington v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir.
1963).
67 Cf. United States v. Weiss, 233 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1956); Trimble
v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C. 1960). See also Hairston v. United
States, 343 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J.) (dissenting opinion).
68 Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 (1967); see Fernandez v. United
States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 1961).
69 156 Colo. 284, 398 P.2d 435 (1965).
70 Id. at 287, 398 P.2d at 437; In re Scaggs, 47 Cal. 2d 416, 303 P.2d 1009
(1956); Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85 (1959); Application of
Wheeler, 81 Nev. 495, 406 P.2d 713 (1965); State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164
A.2d 740 (1960).
71 Steinberg v. United States, 207 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1953) (per curiam);
United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 741 (N.D. Tex. 1964); United States
v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 941, 943 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
THE HASTINGS LAW JfOURNAL [VOL 20
November 1968B
It is an invidious discrimination to deny appellant release because of
his poverty, when for example, his ties in the community or such
devices as release subject to the supervision of the United States Pro-
bation Office, would adequately insure his presence.72
High bail is not justified simply because the defendant's char-
acter is "bad"; there is no presumption from this alone that the de-
fendant is apt to flee 3 Justice Douglas in Cohen v. United States74
looked instead to the defendant's family ties and examined his rec-
ord to ascertain if he had previously forfeited bail for flight.
Bail pending appeal is to be denied only in cases in which, from
substantial evidence, it is clear that the right to bail may be abused
or the community may be threatened by the defendant's release. 75
Such considerations go to the question whether to allow bail, not
to the amount of bail if once found to be allowable. 76 Interruption
of orderly process is still a valid consideration, and bail may be de-
nied to assure safety of witnesses so long as the case is not finalized
or where a new trial is likely.77 Conditions on bail may be imposed
so long as they are relevant to the purpose of preventing flight or
protecting the community. But in Rehman v. California,78 where a
doctor was admitted to bail on condition that he surrender his license
to practice medicine, Justice Douglas reconfirmed his earlier assump-
tion that "it seemed to me dubious that the requirements of due proc-
ess had been met."79
These are the rules within which the courts supposedly must
operate. They present the relevant factors which the courts are to
consider in allowing bail, either before trial or pending appeal. Such
rules are not followed when the judge or other bail-setting person
wishes to teach the accused a lesson. They are not followed by
some judges who make initial determinations or applications for bail
72 Pelletier v. United States, 343 F.2d 322, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also
Timmons v. United States, 343 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
73 Hairston v. United States, 343 F.2d 313, 314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(Bazelon, C.J.) (dissenting opinion).
74 82 S. Ct. 8 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961); cf. United States v. Hinton,
238 F. Supp. 232 (D.D.C. 1965).
75 Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994 (Warren, Circuit Justice, 1962);
Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 666 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962);
Painten v. Massachusetts, 254 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Mass. 1966).
76 Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) with Williamson v. United
States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950). See also Hairston
v. United States, 343 F.2d 313, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
77 Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962).
78 85 S. Ct. 8 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1964).
79 Id. at 9. For another example of an unconstitutional condition, see
Cohen v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 526, 528 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962),
where the trial court had granted bail pending review, provided that the
defendant apply a certain amount of the bail money toward his fine, if upheld:
"The bail fixed would become 'excessive' in the sense of the Eighth Amend-
ment because it would be used to serve a purpose for which bail was not
intended. The purpose of a bail bond is to insure that the accused will reap-
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pending appeal.8 0 They are prone to be ignored by judges con-
fronted with those accused of participating in activities of which the
judge does not approve.8 '
Undesirables in the System: Subversives, Civil Rights
Demonstrators, and Criminals
Subversives
Bail generally is set high if the accused is known to be a Com-
munist, 2 even if Party membership is irrelevant to the crime
charged.8 3 For example, a Cleveland man was arrested for driving
without a license. When the judge found out he was a Communist,
bail was set at $25,000 with the comment: "This is how we treat
Communists in this court." The Ohio Court of Appeals eventually
reduced bail to $200.84 Likewise in Carlson v. Landon,85 a civil case
involving deportation of aliens accused of being Communists, the
District Court judge, in denying bail said: "I am not going to turn
these people loose if they are Communists, any more than I would
turn loose a deadly germ in this community."8 6
In cases of subversion there may be justification for the fear
that the accused will flee: in the Soblen case,8 7 the Eisler case,s8
and the Dennis case,8 9 the defendants all jumped bail and left the
country. 0 Flight certainly is possible and is a legitimate fear in
the case of any party member. 91 But it would seem less likely to
occur in the case of members other than high-ranking party officials.
pear at a given time .... " Accord Cain v. United States, 148 F.2d 182, 1'83
(9th Cir. 1945).
80 Pelletier v. United States, 343 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Hairston v.
United States, 343 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
81 See Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Phil-
adelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1038-39 (1954) (statements made by magis-
trates).
82 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) ($50,000 held excessive for Smith
Act violation); United States v. Weiss, 233 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1956) ($35,000
held excessive for Smith Act violation); Forest v. United States, 203 F.2d 83
(8th Cir. 1953) ($40,000 bail set for alleged Smith Act violation reduced to
$10,000); United States v. Schneiderman, 102 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
United States v. Spector, 102 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Cal. 1951). See also Ex parte
Monti, 79 F. Supp. 651 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
83 RANsoM 49.
84 Id.
85 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
86 Id. at 550, where Justice Black, dissenting, quoted from the record on
appeal.
87 Soblen v. United States, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
944 (1962).
88 Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 190 (1949).
89 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
90 Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 190 (1949); RANsom 55-56.
91 RANSOM 56-59.
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As to the former group, an effort should be made toward more rea-
sonable bail-setting practices than those which presently prevail.
Whether the threat of further crimes of espionage is a valid cri-
terion92 for denial of any bail is questionable.9 3 Once a spy has been
exposed, his ability to function effectively is obviously curtailed.
Visceral reaction to such charges generally demands high bail or no
bail, and the courts have sometimes condoned such reaction,9 4 al-
lowing in effect preventive detention-a detention under most cir-
cumstances unauthorized by the law. 5 Ideally, special procedures
should be established for handling these cases, especially in time of
war when irrationality tends to be prevalent, so that basic principles
of criminal justice are not perverted.
Civil Rights Demonstrators
Perhaps the most unfortunate and the most persecuted persons to
be caught up in misuses and perversion of the bail system are the
civil rights demonstrators. Since they are constantly victimized by
the easily-manipulated bail system, bail has become a prime consid-
eration in the planning of any civil rights demonstration in the South.
Bail has a very serious effect upon us. We must always ask how
much this or that project is going to cost us and where we can get
the money to get past this hurdle and thus be able to get to the more
important things we are aiming at. Often we cannot undertake a
project simply because we are short of the money which we know we
92 E.g., United States v. St. John, 254 F. 794, 798 (7th Cir. 1918); cf.
United States v. Otis, 18 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1927).
93 United States v. Carbo, 82 S. Ct. 662, 667 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1962); Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (Jackson, Circuit Justice,
1950), where, on the question of bail pending appeal, Justice Jackson answered
the contention that the defendants would continue a "course of conduct and
activity dangerous to the public welfare, safety and national security of
the United States." Id. at 281. "If I assume that defendants are disposed to
commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist countries, it is
still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons
by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprison-
ment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excess and injus-
tice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique
to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand
convicted." Id. at 282-83; accord, United States v. Foster, 79 F. Supp. 422, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
94 United States v. St. Johns, 254 F. 794, 797 (7th Cir. 1918); RANsoM 56;
see United States v. Otis, 18 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1927).
95 Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 667 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1962); Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (Jackson, Circuit
Justice, 1950); United States v. Weiss, 233 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1951); see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951). See also Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 645 (Harlan,
Circuit Justice, 1961); Reynolds v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 30, 32 (Douglas,
Circuit Justice, 1959).
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will need to meet the bail problem.9 6
"War chests" must be adequate before a demonstration is undertaken
-if local demonstrators are not bailed out quickly, their morale drops
and their participation in demonstrations ceases. "There is no ques-
tion that the use of excessive bail to deter the demonstrations, which
are constitutionally protected activities, illustrates the worst aspects
of the American bail system. '97
Opponents of the civil rights movement who are within the
local legal power structure in the South may manipulate the bail sys-
tem in many ways in order to injure those involved in the civil rights
movement. One of the most effective misuses is to deny bail outright
and then wait for an appeal or a writ of habeas corpus to be filed.
Bail is often denied pending appeal because such denial is largely a
matter of discretion with the judge under the applicable state law.98
Another favorite tactic is to charge the demonstrators with a
preposterous, but nonbailable offense such as criminal anarchy or at-
tempting to incite insurrection. This was done in Georgia with a
SNCC demonstration where the announced purpose of the charge
was to deny bail. It was not until several months later that a federal
court held the insurrection statute unconstitutional and reduced
bail.99 This ruling was to be expected, since the United States Su-
preme Court had ruled the same statute unconstitutional in 1936.10
Those demonstrators who are admitted to bail are generally given
exorbitantly high bail so that the organization sponsoring the dem-
onstration must choose between bankruptcy, if it bails out its mem-
bers, or failure, if it must leave them in jail for long periods of
time.1' 1 Such tactics have been used as far north as Pennsylvania
where a minister was charged with inciting to riot, unlawful as-
sembly, and conspiracy-in his home town-and bail was set at
$26,500.102 A similar situation occurred in Georgia in Jones v.
Grimes, 0 3 where the court on appeal reduced bail from $20,000 to
$5,000 for a 67-year-old minister who had been convicted of disturbing
divine worship-a misdemeanor-and sentenced to 12 months on pub-
96 Carl Rachlin, chief counsel for CORE, quoted in RANSOM 62.
97 John M. Pratt, legal counsel to the Commission on Religion and Race
for the National Council of Churches, quoted in RANsoM 61.
98 E.g., In re Scaggs, 47 Cal. 2d 416, 303 P.2d 1009 (1956); Brooks v.
State, 172 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1965); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1270-72; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 903.01 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 6-1005 (1964); N.Y. CODE Cam. PRoc.
§ 555 (McKinney Supp. 1967); Omo REV. CODE § 2949.02 (1954), § 2953.09
(Supp. 1967).
99 RANSOM 63-64.
100 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
101 See Wizner, Bail and Civil Rights, 2 L. iN TRANsITION Q. 111-12 (1965);
Claiborne, Bail and Civil Rights, May 29, 1964 (staff report to the National
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, Washington; D.C.); text accompany-
ing note 96 supra.
102 RANSOM 65.
103 219 Ga. 585, 134 S.E.2d 790 (1964).
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lic works, 6 months in jail and a $1,000 fine. Of course there was
no evidence of bond forfeiture, flight, or danger to the judicial process.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that $20,000 was excessive but that
$5,000 was not.10 4 In the same vein is the action of the Alabama
legislature in increasing the maximum amount of bail allowed to be
set by a police court judge from $300 to $2,500 for misdemeanors. 05
Multiple bail resulting from mass arrests is an effective deter-
rent to civil rights activities, not only because of the vast amounts
which must be raised immediately, but also because the money raised
and used as bail is tied up for months pending appeals. The Free-
dom Rides of 1961 and the Birmingham demonstrations of 1963 are
examples of the effectiveness of this use of the bail system against
demonstrators. The Freedom Riders' bond was raised at every stage
of appeal so that the appeal cost CORE $372,000. CORE ran out of
money and private donations were solicited. The bail money was
still tied up in 1965.100
Similarly in Tuscaloosa, in one afternoon, a march from a church
meeting cost 74 persons $75,900 by the time bail on several offenses
per person was totaled.10 7 Often when such demonstrators cannot
or will not make bail, they are sent to penal farms or maximum
security prisons. 08
Arrest on frivolous charges is often made in order to stop the
demonstrators until their cases can be brought before appellate
courts, commonly a wait of 45 to 60 days. 09 Out-of-state cars are
towed away and visitors arrested for such crimes as "cooking in their
rooms.""10 Property bonds are required from these persons in order
to make bail, because they are not residents of the arresting state."'
Once bail is offered by attorneys for the demonstrators, the judge
can raise the bail set and can add new charges." 2 He can change bail
from cash to bonds, from bonds to property, from property to unen-
cumbered property." 3 Different standards of valuation of property
can be used so that many separate parcels of land are required to
meet the bail set." 4 This may continue until the attorneys for the
demonstrators go into federal court for an order requiring the state
officials to stop changing the standards for setting bail, as was done
104 The question whether $5,000 was also excessive did not arise, because
at the hearing to lower the bail counsel indicated that $5,000 could be raised.
Id. at 592, 134 S.E.2d at 793.
105 RA soMa 66.
1o Id. at 68.
107 Id. at 69.
108 Id. at 72-73.
109 Id. at 75-76.
110 Id. at 77.
I1 Id.
112 Id. at 80-81.
13 Id. at 78.
14 Id.; see Wizner, supra note 101, at 120-23.
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during the disturbances in Selma, Alabama, in the spring of 1965.115
Part of the bail problem in the South is caused by the bondsmen,
who are obviously susceptible to local pressure because their busi-
ness, except for the civil rights clients, is composed of local residents.
Often the bondsmen are sympathetic with those setting bail and sim-
ply refused to get involved. This happened in Birmingham, Alabama,
when Martin Luther King met "Bull" Connor in April, 1963, after the
maximum amount chargeable for a misdemeanor bond had just been
raised by the state legislature. Although one bondsman in Birming-
ham was willing to write bonds for the demonstrators, he quickly ran
out of collateral to post with the court, and it was necessary for the
United States Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, to request dona-
tions from four of the major labor unions to meet bail bond require-
ments. The hundreds of thousands of dollars involved in the demon-
strations in this single city were still tied up in 1965.116
Obvious constitutional questions are raised by these practices in
the South. In addition to bail being excessive in most instances,
the planned and persistent conduct on the part of the judiciary
and those engaged in bail-setting could amount to a denial of due
process and equal protection of the laws' 17-- a denial which will con-
tinue to exist simply because civil rights of a more basic nature-
voting rights, freedom to sit anywhere in a bus, to use an indoor lava-
tory or the nearest drinking fountain, to send children to the nearest
or most modern school-are of paramount consideration to the
demonstrators in the South. Relief for the bail abuses discussed
above ultimately must come from a source other than a test case be-
fore the United States Supreme Court, and such relief clearly must
come from a source outside the South. The existing bail system is
working perfectly for those in control of the legal power structure in
the South who seek to utilize its inequities; they see no need for
change. But bail reform is needed urgently and the reform necessary
to curb these evils must be explicit, definitive, mandatory and must
either by-pass local control or impose severe penalties for failure to
comply.
Preventive Detention and the Criminal
The last group to be victimized by the present bail system com-
prises those persons thought to be dangerous to society or to be a
threat to the orderly progress of judicial procedure. These are peo-
115 RANSOm 80.
116 Id. at 86-88.
117 First amendment guarantees of association, petition and assembly are
involved whenever parading without a permit, blocking, failure to disperse
and unlawful assembly are charged. The problems created by juveniles in
jail are so gross as to "shock the conscience." But none of these questions
has been litigated to date and it will be some time before they are consid-
ered prime targets for the accused who are involved. Id. at 88-91.
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ple whose detention before trial or pending appeal is said to be neces-
sary to prevent further crimes, even though such detention may not
be permissible under present law."8 This group is composed of recidi-
vists of both major and minor crimes, of big-time gangsters, of the
criminally insane and of some of the mentally disturbed.
Preventive detention is accomplished either by setting extremely
high bail or by denying bail altogether. That high bail is not in
itself sufficient in all cases to achieve the security this unconstitu-
tional practice seeks is evidenced by the following example:
On April 3, 1963, in Brooklyn, New York, observing persons entering
a church, Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent John P. Foley was
seized, beaten with a pistol, knocked to the sidewalk and stomped on
by four men who then fled into the church. John Lombardozzi, de-
scribed by the Chicago Crime Commission as a well known racketeer,
was arrested as he was leaving the church and charged with assaulting
a federal agent. Three other men, identified as Agent Foley's assail-
ants, were arrested later. Each of the four men were placed under
a $100,000 bond dnd released from confinement."19
A similar situation is found in the Massari incident 20  On com-
pletion of a three-year sentence for burglary, Massari was released
from the Illinois state penitentiary in 1961. On July 8, 1963, he was
apprehended in the act of committing a burglary; he was indicted
and released on bail of $7,000. On August 24, 1963, while free on
bail, he was again apprehended committing a second burglary and
was found to be in the possession of booty from an earlier burglary
on the same day. Again he was indicted for burglary and released
on $4,500 bail. On November 28, he was arrested again, in possession
of a weapon and burglary tools. This pattern continued until trial on
April 24, 1964. By this time, he had been arrested nine times from
July 8, 1963 to March 5, 1964, indicted on ten counts and was free on
$48,500 bail.12'
High bail is not confined to the person who commits a crime
against an officer of the law or to the recidivist. Racketeers and no-
torious gangsters are often held on high bail or denied bail under the
guise of protecting orderly progress of judicial procedure. 122 In re-
118 Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HAnv. L. REV. 1489 (1966).
119 Mann, Panel Discussion: Pretrial Release Problems, 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
20, 27-28.
120 The incident is in the records of the Chicago Police Department. La
Fave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 8, 17.
121 Id. at 18. Had this man had a speedy trial much of what occurred
would have been prevented and society would have been protected from his
recidivism. The flaw in this simple solution is that often neither the defend-
ant nor his counsel wants or is prepared for a speedy trial, within 30 days of
arrest, so that continuances are requested and granted. If a speedy trial were
forced upon the defendant and his counsel, the quality of legal representa-
tion might suffer.
122 Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965
(1964); Meltzer v. United States, 188 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1951); see Note,
Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. R.v. 1489, 1491 (1966).
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ality, the courts are merely assuring that the threats made against
witnesses for the prosecution, and against jurors, are not carried out
by the accused.'2 3
An example of this type of criminal and of the problems the
courts face in dealing with him is found in Carbo v. United States,124
in which Justice Douglas, sitting as Circuit Justice, denied bail pend-
ing appeal because strong evidence existed that the defendant and his
partners and co-defendants had threatened witnesses. Since there
was a great likelihood that a new trial would be necessary, the testi-
mony of these witnesses would be imperative. In denying bail, the
court emphasized that at a former re-trial of Carbo, the charges
against him had been dropped because one key witness had been found
dead and another had never been found. Although Justice Douglas
said the court should not use denial of bail to make one serve a sen-
tence for unproved or uncommitted crimes, the safety of witnesses,
in this particular case, had "relevancy to the bail issue."'125
In Fernandez v. United States, 26 Justice Harlan, in chambers,
denied bail pending trial because of threats made to witnesses in
open court, because of a number of incidents involving injury to
jurors and because of spurious accidents used to delay the trial. Al-
though the court mentioned these threats and incidents, denial of bail
in fact was based upon the inherent power of the court to manage
the conduct of a trial and to assure the fair administration of
justice.
On the other hand, in Sica v. United States, 27 one of Carbo's co-
defendants was admitted to bail. This defendant had a home, family
and business ties in the community. Although he also had a record
of violence and although there was evidence that he had partici-
pated with Carbo in the threats to witnesses, the court said that the
evidence of the threats was not sufficient to keep him imprisoned.
These three cases point out the dilemma facing the judge: he
cannot detain merely because he suspects that a crime may be com-
mitted; he cannot call his action, if he does detain, preventive deten-
tion-it may be that in fact and in effect but it must be called some-
thing else. When the court has a record before it which shows past
behavior and present threats, as in Carbo, it is easy for it to protect
the judicial process and protect society as well (like the theological
principle of double effect) without acting unconstitutionally. With-
out such documentation, it is theoretically impossible to act.
123 Of course, this alone does not prevent the commission of additional
crimes, because the henchmen of the accused may carry out his orders and
see that people do not appear to testify or to act as jurors.
124 Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962).
125 Id. at 688.
126 81 S. Ct. 642 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 1961).
127 82 S. Ct. 669 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962). See also Carbo v. United
States, 302 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1962); Carbo v. United States, 300 F.2d 889 (9th
Cir. 1962).
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Preventive detention is used also to keep psychopaths and the
criminally insane from committing additional crimes. Unfortunately,
it sometimes takes several weeks to test an accused to ascertain
whether he has such tendencies, and during this time, he is confined.
It is not possible to predict when such a person will be driven again to
commit a crime, although there is some evidence that it is possible to
ascertain that he will act again in the same manner sometime in the
future. 28 Because of the slowness of psychiatric analysis, it is neces-
sary to detain a first offender who may fall into this category solely
on the basis of the offense charged, or, so often in reality, on the
judge's reaction to the manner in which the crime was committed.
This is unfortunate, since it seems clear that often a once-in-a-
lifetime crime of passion, committed by a person who has shown no
criminal or psychotic tendencies in the past and who will probably
never be moved to behave violently again, is easily confused with
the first crime of a seriously disturbed person, whose illness has ad-
vanced to the point where uncontrollable violent and destructive ten-
dencies are manifesting themselves. Unless the judge setting bail is
presented with ample evidence of the background of the accused
charged with the commission of violent crimes, he cannot make the
necessarily difficult distinctions essential to a correct decision.
A common method by which the above dilemma is avoided is to
institute a civil commitment proceeding with its concomitant sanity
investigation. The detention necessary for this procedure is not un-
constitutional and there is no denial of criminal justice because the
basic premise of such a proceeding is that the accused is so sick that
he is not responsive to the deterrence provided by criminal law and
cannot be dealt with within criminal procedure.
129
The last group to be held in preventive detention comprises
those who may be considered either mentally disturbed but not psy-
chotic, or recidivists, or both. Such are persons accused of incest,
rape, child molestation-sociopathological behavior. It is obvious that
if released, the danger of commission of additional crimes of this type
is great, not only because the person committing them cannot con-
trol himself, but also because of the opportunity available to the ac-
Cused who returns home to live with the victim of his incest, or who
is released into a city full of unprotected women and children.
That these persons are as much in need of treatment as those in
the psychotic and dangerously insane group discussed above is clear;
yet these persons do not receive treatment as quickly as those who
128 See 1965 NATIONAL CoNmRlEwc ON BAIL AND CRmnEAL JusTICE 173.
129 See Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1489,
1504 (1965). The defendant in a civil commitment proceeding is represented
at each hearing by legal counsel and is protected by elaborate statutory
schemes which require prompt observation, analysis and treatment; such stat-
utes provide for frequent review of the progress made by the committed-
person to ensure that one is not committed unnecessarily, or if committed,
that one receives constant treatment. -E.g., CAL. WELl. & INST'NS CoDE § 5200.
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commit barbarous murders.13 0 These persons still are kept within the
criminal law and are expected to respond to it, simply because they
have not lost touch with reality as a psychotic has. Detention of
these individuals may or may not result in preventing further crime.
It will not protect society in the long run' 31 and so long as a judge
can accomplish preventive detention sub rosa, and thus keep these
people within the confines of the criminal law instead of releasing
them to "suffer" civil penalties, injustice will be done.
In detaining accused persons falling within the above categor-
ies, the court is confronted with a conflict of principles and duties.
On the one hand, the court is obligated to protect society; on the
other, it is bound to honor the presumption of innocence and the
fundamental proposition that crime is deterred not by prejudgment
and prior punishment, but by conviction and incarceration after the
case is finally settled.132 The conflict is complicated further by the
absence of sufficient information concerning the scope of the problem
of recurrent crime. One study of Own Recognizance programs indi-
cates that less than 1 percent of those released are arrested for crimes
pending trial;133 however, since most of the persons who commit
homicide or sex crimes are excluded from OR projects, these statistics
are of questionable value.134  At the 1965 National Conference on
Bail and Criminal Justice, it was suggested that offenders in the
above categories compose about 3 percent of the criminal case load.135
More information is needed before feasible solutions can be achieved.
At the present time, however, preventive detention is practiced sub
130 See F. LuNDMAN & D. McINTY, JR., THE MENTALLY DISTURBED AND THE
LAW 298-308 (1961); Tappan, Some Myths about Sex Offenders, 19 FED. PRO-
BATION 7 (1955). For an analysis of the treatment afforded the sexual psy-
chopath under the law, see Comment, The Validity of the Segregation of the
Sexual Psychopath Under the Law, 26 OHio ST. L.J. 640 (1965).
131 Judges who incarcerate these persons instead of giving them medical
treatment not only pervert the bail system and the fundamental concepts of
criminal justice, but also do society a disservice by not allowing these accused
the medical treatment which may enable them to become useful members
of society.
132 See Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895); discussed in text
accompanying note 3 supra; United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155
F.2d 1002, 1004 (2d Cir. 1946); Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85
(1959); Mann, Panel Discussion: Pretrial Release Problems, 1965'U. ILL. L.F.
27, 29; cf. L. CARROLL, ALIcE IN WONDERLAND--THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
226-27 (Mod. Lib. ed.): "'For instance, now,' [the Queen] went on. . . 'there's
the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial
doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last
of all.'
"'Suppose he never commits the crime?' said Alice.
"'That would be all the better, wouldn't it?' the Queen said ....
'33 Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1496
(1965).
134 Id. at 1497.
135 1965 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON7 BA3L'AND CRn~nNAL JUSTICE 173.
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rosa by the courts, who must violate fundamental principles of
criminal justice and abuse the bail system in order to "protect soci-
ety."
Bail Reform
Bail and Summons Projects
Several bail reform projects are in operation in major cities
throughout the United States. The most common project is based on
the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project and the Summons
Project which has proved to be extraordinarily successful in aiding
the indigent.
The bail project utilizes law students to interview the accused
while in detention at the jail house. Questions are asked concerning
the accused's family situation, employment, habits, community ties,
and past record. On the basis of the answers given, a point score is
totaled and if the accused scores high enough, the information given
is verified by the interviewer, and a report with a recommendation
regarding the individual accused's pretrial disposition is given to the
judge, the prosecuting attorney and the counsel for the accused.
When the project began in 1961, judges and prosecuting attorneys
followed Vera's recommendations only 55 percent of the time.130 To-
day this figure has increased to 70 percent for the judges and 80
percent for the prosecutors. 1 37 Reliance on Vera recommendations has
proved to be justified. In its first two and one-half years of operation
in New York City, it was found that of those persons recommended for
release, only 1.5 percent failed to appear at the trial-a figure lower
than that of their counterparts released on the traditional money
bail.138 Most significant to the accused, and to a resolution of the con-
stitutional questions raised by pretrial confinement of an indigent,
are statistics which show that those released on Vera recommenda-
tions receive lighter sentences, if they are sentenced at all.139
In a controlled experiment, Vera established two groups of de-
fendants, both equally eligible for release according to Vera standards
(which, incidentally, are the same standards used by the commercial
bondsman). One group was released; the other group remained in
jail up to the time of trial. Of the released group, 60 percent were not
convicted and of the 40 percent who were convicted, only one-sixth
went to jail. In the other group, only 23 percent were not convicted
and of the 77 percent who were convicted, 90 percent went to jail.140
That those released before trial fared better is apparent-they were
either acquitted or given suspended sentences.
1 41
136 Id. at 46.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 49.
'39 Id. at 46.
140 RANsoM 158.
141 Id.
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There has been some experimentation with variables such as the
type of crime, quality of counsel, amount of bail, family ties and rec-
ord of employment, as well as with pretrial detention, but the only
factor which made any difference in the outcome of the case has
been pre-trial detention.142
While not scientifically conclusive, the Vera results to date do indi-
cate at least that investigation is helpful in determining whom to
release; that supervision without detention can be quite effective in
assuring the presence of defendants at trials; that the availability of
money for a bond premium is not necessarily related to whether a
defendant will flee; that most defendants will appear for trial vol-
untarily if humanely assisted; and that a tremendous amount of pre-
trial detention is unnecessary and wasteful to the state, and terribly
prejudicial to the defendant.143
Another aspect of bail reform encouraged by Vera has been the
expanded use of the summons in minor criminal cases. An investiga-
tion similar to that described above is conducted at the police station
when the accused is brought in, and if the information given can be
verified, he is released without making bail or being put in jail. All
that is necessary is the completion of the paperwork required to
give the accused notice to appear. Similar results have been obtained
in the summons project. As in the bail projects, fewer nonappear-
ances and lighter sentences were the results of the summons pro-
ject.144
The Ten Per Cent Plan
A third type of bail reform aimed not at the indigent, but rather
at the accused who can afford bail, is the Illinois 10 percent plan.
Prior to the initiation of this plan, it had been found that often bonds
of several thousand dollars were required when the ultimate fine
was as small as $50, and that several bonds ordinarily were required
before the accused came to trial, so that it often cost more to be
accused than to be convicted.145 To correct this situation, in 1963
the Illinois legislature revamped its criminal procedure code. Not
only was credit to be given for pre-trial detention of an accused, but
expanded use of the summons was encouraged and a quick trial re-
sulted from the provision requiring the release of any defendant not
tried within 120 days of his arrest, or if on bail, within 120 days
from the time he demanded a trial.146 The major feature of the plan
was its effort to restore the administration of bail to the courts by
allowing the accused to deposit with the court 10 percent of the bail
set. If the defendant appeared for trial, 90 percent of the initial de-
posit was refunded; 1 percent of the original amount was kept to
142 Id. at 163.
143 Id. at 165.
144 Id. at 169.
145 Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U.
ILL. L.F. 35.
146 RANSOm 200-01.
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cover costs of administration and of chasing down bail jumpers, who
are charged with an additional substantive crime. Anyone who
could deposit the entire amount was refunded all of his money.
147
Statistics show that in 1964 in the circuit court for Cook county,
bondsmen wrote 600 bonds and suffered forfeiture in 6.3 percent of
the cases they handled, while the state, through its 10 percent provi-
sion, covered 686 bonds and suffered only 5.4 percent forfeiture.
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Practical and Constitutional Problems
It is clear, however, that neither the Vera Foundation type of bail
and summons reform, nor the Illinois 10 percent plan, is the complete
answer. Of course these plans were never meant to be panaceas, and
perhaps their greatest shortcoming is that although they were de-
signed to break patterns of bail and to stimulate new thinking about
bail, they still operate within a system that is basically unjust and
easily misused.
In the Vera-type projects, recommendation is not available for
those who do not reside in or have ties within the community. Thus
a transient or a new resident is excluded from consideration by the
project. Those accused of major crimes are also excluded from the
project.149
Because the organization of the project differs from city to city,
other problems arise. For example, although the interviewing agency
should be an impartial fact-finding body, in some areas this task has
fallen to the public defender or to the district attorney's office, nei-
ther of which can be said to be impartial. In other areas, probation
departments, which traditionally deal only with the convicted, han-
dle interviews and pre-trial supervision. Sometimes welfare depart-
ments interview.15 0
Also relevant to the problem of interviewing is the issue of what
is to be done with the information obtained. In New York, it is given
to the judge, prosecutor, and defender.151 The prosecutor may in-
formally agree never to subpoena the interviewer as a witness for
147 Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U.
ILL. L.F. 35, 37, 39.
148 Id. at 38.
149 It has often been stated by those who work for such projects that ini-
tial exclusion of homicide, sex and narcotic crimes is necessary for public
relations but as the program is accepted in the community, the necessity for
exclusion of such crimes disappears. Some projects, notably that in Washing-
ton, D.C., exclude no crime and report statistics close to those reported above.
See RANsOM 154; 1965 CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRInAL JUSTICE 44, 69;
Baron, Workshop, Establishing Bail Projects, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 42-43.
150 There is danger in having someone not trained in the law conduct the
interview, since the accused inadvertently may reveal information relevant to
the crime charged, or may make statements which should be made only
within the privileged attorney-client relation.
151 1965 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL Aw] CRUMINAL JUSTICE 44.
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the prosecution, but such agreements are not made everywhere nor
are there project regulations against use of the interviewer by the
prosecution. Without an agreement or regulation excluding the inter-
viewer from the reach of the prosecution, there is an obvious danger
to the accused who gives such information.
The contents of the report are important, especially if the case is
tried by the same judge who sets bail, without a jury, since the re-
port often contains such information as the accused's past convictions,
use of drugs, parole violations and the like. Such information should
not be given to the trier of fact. A similar problem arises when the
judge is accustomed to receiving a recommendation in certain types of
cases and is not presented with one-where, for example, the accused
is not a resident so that verification and recommendation is not
possible. Whether the lack of recommendation prejudices the judge
against the defendant and encourages suspicion against him is a
problem which must be faced and resolved, especially in small com-
munities, where the judge setting bail may also hear the case on trial.
The problem of the nonresident could be solved by using a police
teletype device, or by shifting the burden of proof onto the prosecution
to show why this person should not be released without bail. The
danger of subpoenaing information could be obviated by an agree-
ment or a regulation, as mentioned above. But the problems of who
is to interview, who is to receive copies of the results of the inter-
view, what information is to be contained on the result sheet, and
what effect is to be given the absence of recommendation are not
easy to resolve, since questions of equal protection, as well as of self-
incrimination, are involved. Although project directors are aware that
such constitutional problems exist, no solution has been suggested. Al-
though services are beginning to be expanded to all economic brackets
and to all crimes, perhaps with further expansion such problems will
be solved. At present, however, they constitute major constitutional
shortcomings.
The paramount defect in the Illinois 10 percent plan is that it is
financially oriented so that the indigent must still remain in jail. He
has the choice now between paying 10 percent to the state or to the
bondsman. The problem, of which the Illinois legislature must have
been aware when it began to consider bail reform, is that the indi-
gent does not have 10 percent to pay anyone. All the Illinois plan
has done is to return control of the bail system to the courts. It
has not begun to go as far as the Vera-type program has gone in
preventing the denial of equal protection or due process to the poor.
This is unfortunate because it has been shown persuasively that pre-
trial detention has a marked effect on the quality of treatment which
the accused receives at his trial.
In addition, neither project could remedy misuses of the bail sys-
tem in situations involving civil rights demonstrators or other un-
popular groups, or in cases wherein the judge thinks preventive
detention is necessary. Because Vera-type recommendations can be
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refused by the judge, such a project would be useless in the South,
where judicial discrimination is at the core of the bail problem.
Similarly, as long as a judge could refuse to follow a recommenda-
tion, he could accomplish preventive detention, at least until his deci-
sion is reviewed. Perhaps the only difference between the present
bail situation and a Vera-type situation is that in the latter, a judge
faced with a civil rights demonstrator, or a suspected racketeer, would
have to specify for the record the reason for which he refused the
recommendation.
The 10 percent provision would not be of great help in the
South. The same amount of money would be necessary to bail out
demonstrators; the only difference could be that some money would
be returned when the demonstrators appeared. This advantage easily
could be nullified by requiring even higher initial bail, which could
be done at the judge's discretion, or by continuing to arrest for non-
bailable offenses. Similarly the 10 percent provision would not help
those in danger of being detained to protect society, or to protect the
judicial process, because many of the offenses charged against mem-
bers of this group are non-bailable offenses.
Recommendations
To reform adequately the present bail situation, several major
changes would seem to be necessary:
(1) Bail should be stripped of its financial aspects. Loss of
money has not deterred anyone from fleeing and has only caused the
indigent without money to remain in jail and thus suffer because of
poverty, not guilt. Instead, any crime which is not so serious as to
warrant preventive detention should be "bailable" by the accused
when arrested and taken to the police station:
(a) In the case of specified misdemeanors and nonviolent
felonies, by the accused's merely making a promise to appear;
(b) In the case of specified violent felonies, by the ac-
cused's receiving a summons to appear at a stated time.
(2) For those who are admitted to bail, either on their promise
to appear or on summons, the commission of any additional crime
should mean automatic loss of liberty. There should be no method
by which one who commits a second crime pending trial could "buy"
his release. But to protect the accused from detention for a crime he
did not commit, stringent standards of proof of the commission of the
subsequent crime must be established; "reasonable cause to believe"
that a crime has been committed should not be enough.
(3) Intentional failure to appear, or "bail-jumping," should be an
additional substantive crime.
(4) Officers "on the beat" should be required to issue summonses
to appear in cases of misdemeanors or nonviolent felonies. (The
crimes wherein the summons is to be used and the circumstances un-
der which it is to be issued must be explicitly delineated so there
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will be minimal reliance on discretion and hence maximum protec-
tion against misfeasance or misuse.)
(5) Crimes in which the promise to appear on issuance of sum-
mons is used must be listed. There should be no reason for question
by the court of whether a particular offense is "bailable" as set forth
in (1), supra.
(6) (a) Pending trial, a person accused of a serious or violent
felony should be required to report weekly to an officer of the court,
a clergyman, a doctor, etc. He should be required to obtain employ-
ment. Other conditions may be required for enumerated "grave"
offenses-conditions such as the relinquishment of a passport, sleep-
ing in jail, geographic limitations on travel, etc.
(b) Those persons accused of misdemeanors should be re-
quired to report to an officer of the court on a bi-weekly basis.
(7) Pre-trial detention should be permitted only in the case of
the psychotic and sociopathic, and even for such persons it should
not consist of incarceration but rather of medical treatment. Explicit
and detailed regulations providing for the time in which such deten-
tion is allowed are necessary, and a Vera-type investigation would
be helpful in this particular situation to give the court the necessary
background information. If it is found that these persons are seri-
ously ill, their detention should not be criminal, but civil.
Detention should not be used for recidivists. Instead, such per-
sons should be released into the custody of their attorney, as now is
done in general in the Tulsa bail reform project. 152 Under these cir-
cumstances, attorneys should welcome the opportunity to bring these
persons to trial as early as possible so that any danger to society occa-
sioned by their liberty would be minimized.
Detention should not be used against those who "may" endan-
ger the judicial process; e.g., racketeers. Instead, these persons should
be placed under close police surveillance, should be required to report
daily to an officer of the court, and their release should be condi-
tioned specifically upon their not contacting any witness or juror.
(8) The constitutional question whether bail is a right guaran-
teed implicitly in the eighth amendment or is merely a statutory
right should be satisfactorily answered. Ideally, it should be consid-
ered a constitutional right so that states would be required to imple-
ment appropriate regulations for immediate relief, and so that re-
course could be had to the federal courts.
(9) On appeal, the issue of the bail of one convicted of a crime
should be implemented according to the category of crime applicable
in each instance. If there is danger of flight, and evidence of this dan-
ger, the defendant should be required to report daily to a judicial
officer and to sleep in.
(10) Bar associations or judges' associations should discipline
152 RANSOM 207.
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those judges who misuse bail and abuse the discretion granted them
in setting bail. Provision should be made by either of these groups
to hear complaints regarding bail-setting practices and to suspend or
remove those judges who are shown to have reacted in a self-righteous
or a malevolent manner.
These proposals leave little to the exercise of judicial discretion.
Such action is necessary to insure that judges will not abuse their dis-
cretion and violate the law in order to teach people lessons or to
punish unpopular groups. The proposed guidelines eliminate ability
to pay as a factor in determining whether or not one is released.
By providing the same requirements for all "bailed" persons, dis-
crimination between residents and transients is eliminated. Al-
though there is no Vera-type investigation, it is not believed that
one is necessary to assure appearance in the vast majority of cases.
Such an investigation should be undertaken though for those who
are in danger of "preventive detention" as described in recommenda-
tion (7), supra. Recidivists and habitual offenders, released in the
custody of their attorneys, are given speedy trials, thus curtailing po-
tential dangers to the community. Those who are seriously disturbed
are given medical treatment, not merely incarceration.
Although such a system is somewhat inconvenient for the ac-
cused and poses an administrative burden on the courts, it is certainly
superior to one which discriminates against and punishes the poor and
the unpopular and which allows the wealthy to buy their freedom.
The danger inherent in such a system as that proposed is that its
rigidity and its absence of discretion will be as abusive as is the present
bail system, since no room is made for the exceptions which are
always necessary when dealing with people and their problems. But
given these as guidelines, it is hoped, at the very least, that a system
based on the accused's own recognizance, on maximum bonds no
greater than maximum penalties, and on judicial supervision of its
own members will evolve from the reform projects and the resultant
interest such projects have aroused in the general population.
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